The present study examined the neural substrate of two classes of quantifiers: numerical quantifiers like "at least three" which require magnitude processing, and logical quantifiers like "some" which can be understood using a simple form of perceptual logic. We assessed these distinct classes of quantifiers with converging observations from two sources: functional imaging data from healthy adults, and behavioral and structural data from patients with corticobasal degeneration who have acalculia. Our findings are consistent with the claim that numerical quantifier comprehension depends on a lateral parietal-dorsolateral prefrontal network, but logical quantifier comprehension depends instead on a rostral medial prefrontal-posterior cingulate network. These observations emphasize the important contribution of abstract number knowledge to the meaning of numerical quantifiers in semantic memory and the potential role of a logic-based evaluation in the service of non-numerical quantifiers.
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Introduction
Numerical knowledge and language are intricately related. We use language to refer to numerical concepts, including cardinal number words (i.e. "one") and also using certain quantifier terms, such as "most". However, the exact nature of this relationship is a matter of much debate. Most previous analyses investigating concepts of magnitude have examined the extent to which language faculties are necessary for precise numerical understanding. In this study, we adopt an alternate approach; that is, we examine words whose conceptual representation depends in part on knowledge of magnitude.
The processes underlying numerical comprehension have received increased attention recently (Ansari & Dhital, 2006; Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Kaas, Henik, & Goebel, 2007; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007 (Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003) , some complex numerical manipulations appear to depend in part on linguistic mediation, as suggested by their reliance on perisylvian language regions (Baldo & Dronkers, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003) . However, language abilities are not necessary for all aspects of number meaning; other aspects of number knowledge, such as the appreciation of quantity, or magnitude comprehension, can be demonstrated in preverbal infants and primates, who lack advanced language abilities (Cantlon & Brannon, 2007; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, 2005) . Quantifier terms are noun phrases which we believe may also rely in part on a magnitude comprehension system. These terms are common in daily speech, yet we know little about their neural basis. A quantifier is a noun phrase that asserts a property from a set and maps this to a truth-value (Clark & Grossman, 2007; Frege & van Heijenoort, 2000) . There are several distinct classes of generalized quantifiers defined in formal linguistics (Keenan & Stavi, 1986; van Benthem, 1986 ), and we focus on two in the current study: cardinal and Aristotelian. Cardinal quantifiers, which we refer to as "numerical quantifiers" from this point forward, are based in part on knowledge of magnitude. Consider the sentence "at least three scientists drink coffee." The comprehension of this sentence relies on the magnitude expressed by "three". If only two coffee-drinking scientists can be identified, then the statement is false. This can be contrasted with Aristotelian quantifiers, which we will refer to as "logical quantifiers". These do not depend on quantity. Logical quantifiers like "some" and "all" are based instead on an elementary logic system that detects the presence of a unique
